The US is disaggregating space architectures by splitting missions currently combined on large satellites into mission-specific smaller satellites. Disaggregation offers five potential key advantages: resiliency, technology refresh, industrial base, adaptability, and cost. Experts essentially concur on the first four advantages, but disagree about cost.
Introduction
If you dislike change, you're going to dislike irrelevance even more.
General Eric Shinseki 1 The US national security space enterprise is entering a period of change. The change is both unwanted and inevitable. The change is unwanted because the enterprise has mostly recovered from a tumultuous period of failed and canceled programs that germinated with acquisition reform in the 1990s; the enterprise would like to continue with architectures that are now working. 2 The change is inevitable, though, because the nation's long-term fiscal situation and priorities are leading to declining budgets. Current space architectures are unsustainable, even with flat budgets, and cannot gracefully absorb budget cuts. 3 Though unwanted and inevitable, the coming change is good and there is little reason to fear or fight it. The transition through the period of change is also imminently manageable. In addition to recognizing and emphasizing the urgency for change, the commanders of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) have explained the desired end state: affordable and resilient architectures. To reach this end state, the US must disaggregate, with capabilities currently residing on a few large satellites migrated to a greater number of smaller satellites. 4 There are five potential key advantages of disaggregated architectures: resiliency, technology refresh, industrial base, adaptability, and cost. Resiliency refers to an architecture's ability to continue to provide needed capabilities in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions. 5 Clearly, if a constellation consists of only one large satellite and that satellite is lost, the effect is much greater than if a constellation consists of 20 small satellites and one is lost. Technology refresh opportunities and industrial base advantages accrue from manufacturing more satellites on shorter production timelines. Large and complex satellites are less conducive to technology insertion because the consequences of potentially inducing a mission failure are so high. The high cost of complex satellites leads to low production rates that are not cost-effective and allow workforce skills to atrophy. Disaggregation increases adaptability because 1) programs can more easily modify smaller satellites to incorporate new capabilities for emerging threats, and 2)
programs can more gracefully adjust the architecture itself to accommodate budget changes.
These first four potential key advantages of disaggregation are reasonably well recognized and understood. 6 Space experts disagree about the fifth potential advantage of disaggregated architectures:
cost. The answer to whether disaggregated architectures are less expensive depends on the details of each mission area and, importantly, the assumptions used for the analysis. Due to the resiliency, technology refresh, industrial base, and adaptability advantages already mentioned, the US is likely to eventually transition to disaggregated architectures; the timing and risk associated with that transition, however, are important unknown details. The cost ramifications of disaggregation will drive the timing and risks, so understanding those cost ramifications, with the underlying cost drivers and trends, is of crucial importance and the subject of this research.
Cost advantages will emerge from disaggregated architectures when the US significantly reduces launch costs, significantly increases resiliency requirements, and/or values architecture flexibility more highly. Since all three of these trends favorable to disaggregated architectures are already occurring, those conducting analyses of architecture alternatives should explicitly model excursions to address these trends. Only by doing so will they capture the cost benefits of disaggregation.
To illustrate the principles and complexity of analyzing the cost ramifications of disaggregation, this research uses a hypothetical communications space architecture example.
Adopting a hypothetical architecture avoids classification and proprietary issues without sacrificing general principles or conceptual understanding. While the architecture is hypothetical, the cost estimates are realistic and based on published models and information.
The paper presents a baseline cost analysis of a disaggregated vs. an aggregated architecture.
From that baseline, excursions show the impact of changes to launch costs, resiliency requirements, and architecture flexibility requirements. The paper then presents some important disaggregation implementation considerations and concludes with recommendations.
Life Cycle Cost Estimating for Space Systems-Baseline Case
The practice of formal cost estimating in defense acquisition dates back to 1936, when T.P. Wright developed "learning curve" equations to predict aircraft manufacturing costs over long production runs. 7 Techniques evolved through World War II and models became more sophisticated. In 1986 Congress amended Title 10 to mandate independent life-cycle cost estimates for major defense acquisition programs. 8 Cost modeling cannot prevent acquisition program cost overruns, but accurate cost estimates are an important planning and decision tool within the DoD acquisition process. 
Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model

Sensitivity Analysis, Changing Assumptions, and Key Cost Drivers
Cost analysts base nominal cost analyses such as the comparison in the previous section on many underlying assumptions. They must use assumptions to reduce the trade space to a manageable size, but it is vital to question those assumptions carefully because they can change over time. In addition, sometimes explicit actions can be taken to change assumptions that are significant cost drivers. Three particularly important assumptions for the communications satellite example are launch costs, resiliency requirements, and architecture flexibility requirements.
Launch Costs
An examination of Table 1 The bottom line with respect to launch costs is that the DoD could significantly reduce them by competitively procuring launches. Table 2 shows the positive impact this change would have on disaggregation costs. Switching to SpaceX launches drives down the cost of both the aggregated and disaggregated architectures, as expected. For each architecture, the impact of lowering launch costs is proportional to the number of launch vehicles required. Since the disaggregated architecture requires two launch vehicles, as compared to the one required for the aggregated architecture, switching to SpaceX drives the cost of the disaggregated architecture down twice as much as it drives down the cost of the aggregated architecture. The result is that the disaggregated architecture becomes the least expensive. Disaggregating and lowering the cost of launch go hand-in-hand; disaggregating without breaking the bank requires lower launch costs, and lower launch costs cause disaggregation to become fiscally attractive in some circumstances. Viewing resiliency in this simplified manner enables it to be easily incorporated into cost estimates. Continuing with the example of disaggregating a communications satellite, Table 3 shows that when the resiliency requirement is added, the disaggregated architecture becomes even more cost advantageous. As compared to the baseline, both resilient architectures are less expensive, which illustrates that the opportunity cost of remaining with ULA as the monopoly launch provider can be viewed as either lost resiliency or, if the value of resiliency is ignored, foregone doubling of communication capability from building and launching a second satellite. Table 3 . Disaggregation cost comparison with resiliency requirement added
Flexibility
A third cost driver is flexibility. Relatively frequent requirement changes, while always unwelcome to a program, are a fact of life because today's threats and opportunities evolve rapidly; the stability of the Cold War is over, but the DoD still unrealistically expects space programs to solidify requirements a decade or more in advance because of long build times for large, aggregated satellites. One simple but reasonable approach to capturing the value of flexibility is to assume that a re-design, build, and launch of a modified satellite will be required at some point after the initial design is completed. Additional NRE, an additional satellite vehicle, and an additional launch vehicle must therefore be added to each architecture. Table 4 displays the cost ramifications of incorporating this flexibility requirement. The bottom line is that the disaggregated, resilient, and flexible architecture is 38% less expensive than the aggregated, resilient, and flexible architecture. Importantly, the disaggregated, resilient, and flexible architecture is also still less expensive than the baseline architecture and provides 25% more communication capability to the warfighter. Table 4 . Disaggregation cost comparison with flexibility requirement added
Consequences of Revisiting Assumptions
Assumptions made with respect to launch costs, resiliency requirements, and flexibility requirements are important drivers of the cost ramifications of disaggregation. Rather than continuing to assume these three factors are unchanging or unchangeable, the US space enterprise should explicitly include excursions to the nominal assumptions for these factors when evaluating disaggregation options. Pursuing disaggregation aggressively does not mean pursuing it blindly. There are natural limits to disaggregation. First, some missions cannot be disaggregated because of technical requirements; in an imagery satellite, for example, a particular lens size may be required, it may be large, and there may already be no other payloads on the satellite. However, it is essential to view disaggregation as splitting out missions rather than merely space hardware.
Applying this perspective to the imagery example, it may be possible to disaggregate mediumresolution imagery from high-resolution imagery as two distinct missions that could be performed from two varieties/sizes of satellite instead of one. The strongest cases for disaggregation will be multi-mission satellites with severable hardware combined onto a single bus, especially when the bus requirements for one mission differ or conflict with the bus requirements for the other mission. For example, Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites have two payloads, one that moves while the other must remain stationary, and
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites have two payloads, one that requires nuclear hardening while the other does not. shifts the integration challenges and other problems associated with aggregation to another entity. 35 The apparent cost advantages of hosted payloads often accrue from using foreign or commercial launch services. To ensure best value for the government and compare concepts on an apples-to-apples basis, program managers considering hosted payloads must also consider dedicated, government-owned small satellites launched on foreign or commercial rockets.
Hosted payloads are therefore an example of partial disaggregation. They represent a step in the right direction, but payloads should be shifted to mission-specific smaller satellites to fully achieve the desired enterprise-level benefits of disaggregation.
Implementation Considerations
Once the US space enterprise decides or accepts that some disaggregation will occur in some of the US space architectures within the near future, then the key set of questions shifts from "whether" and "when" to "how," and especially how to manage budgets and risk during the transition to disaggregated architectures. This section focuses on this next layer of implementation details and, in particular, on budget phasing issues, formal requirement changes, and countering inertia and self-interest of contractors and program offices.
Budget Phasing
One of the advantages of disaggregated architectures is that small satellites can be built faster than the typical 10-year lead time for a large satellite. Given that satellites have finite SMC builds the first two satellites of a series with development (3600) funds and any additional satellites in the series with procurement (3020) funds. A "full funding" requirement that an end item be fully budgeted in the year the contract is awarded applies only to 3020 funding. When an architecture is disaggregated, these rules permit an additional disaggregation dividend to be harvested from near-term budgets because the funding for the first two new satellites can be spread across several years instead of concentrated in the first year.
These near-term disaggregation dividends can also be understood in the context of lean production principles; work-in-progress is a form of waste, and migrating from long-lead satellites to short-lead satellites generates immediate cost savings by reducing work-inprogress. 36 Even though production quantities of space systems are typically low, their 5 Capability Requirements Process, 37 as appropriate. Both processes typically require millions of dollars of supporting analysis and document preparation and several years of effort. Figure 3 illustrates the JCIDS process. The reason for raising this topic as an implementation consideration is to note that each program contemplating disaggregation should review its guiding requirements documents to determine any needed revisions. In addition and while awaiting these JCIDS updates, AFSPC and the NRO should consider publishing policy guidance urging or requiring programs to consider and place value in low-cost launch, resilience, and flexibility. For example, a policy could state that all programs shall disaggregate their architectures/satellites, competitively procure launch services, meet specified resilience and flexibility constraints, and obtain 3-star-level waivers for policy noncompliance. Such a policy would urge programs toward disaggregation while still allowing reasonable waivers. 
Countering Inertia and Self-interest
Finally, a third implementation consideration is for leaders to recognize that the migration toward disaggregated architectures is going to be difficult, politically more than technically. The DoD acquisition system inadvertently favors large, expensive, multi-mission platforms such as the current aggregated space architectures. Three particularly pertinent reasons for this phenomenon are:
1. Contractor profit motives favor complexity and aggregation. More contractors possess the skills and expertise to construct small satellites than to construct large and complex satellites, so disaggregation is likely to increase competition and lower profit margins. Adding a payload to an existing satellite, on the other hand, boosts the incumbent contractor's profits without any competition.
2. Cost overruns result in few if any negative consequences. The DoD budget process usually prioritizes "disconnect" overruns above "initiatives" 38 and the DoD rarely cancels programs that overrun, even after repeated Nunn-McCurdy breaches.
Bureaucracies and contractors strive to increase their budgets and there are very few "new starts," so cost overruns are sometimes the easiest way to increase budget, power, and profits. This motivation is especially strong when combined with cost plus contracts and/or program offices that readily award scope-increasing contract modifications. These cost overruns are more common on complex systems. Countering these powerful incentives and the other inertia of the status quo to oppose disaggregation will be difficult. Once leaders recognize the challenges, though, they can counter the bureaucracy's and contractors' undesirable natural tendencies by strengthening independent government system engineering and cost estimating capabilities, conducting more frequent competitions, and shifting some integration responsibilities away from the prime contractor.
Excellent people behaving with integrity populate the national security space enterprise. If senior leaders are not obtaining the affordable and resilient disaggregation they desire, they must 1) recognize the incentives they have put in place, and 2) use policy and the checks and balances within their organizations to counter and shift those incentives.
Acquisition became relatively easy when the money spigot turned on in 2001; that era has ended. Leading the space enterprise through disaggregation and the other changes needed to thrive in a period of declining resources will be a challenging endeavor. To pursue disaggregation successfully, leaders within the national security space enterprise must carefully consider implementation details relating to budget phasing, formal requirement changes, and countering inertia and self-interest.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The US should pursue space disaggregation more aggressively. In addition to the well-recognized advantages of resiliency, technology refresh, industrial base, and adaptability, many disaggregated architectures could be less expensive than the baseline architectures. Cost advantages will emerge from disaggregated architectures when the US significantly reduces launch costs, significantly increases resiliency requirements, and/or values architecture flexibility more highly. All three of these trends favorable to disaggregated architectures are occurring and the US could accelerate them to enable cost-effective disaggregation.
In order to reap the financial benefits of disaggregation, the US should end the ULA monopoly on launch. The monopoly is inconsistent with free-market values and the opportunity cost of continuing it may now exceed 75% of $70B through 2030. The US desperately needs those funds for building the satellites themselves. Switching to competitively procured US commercial launch capabilities, backed up by foreign capabilities when needed, will dramatically lower the cost of launch and thereby enable disaggregation to be financially viable.
A policy change that would accelerate ending the ULA monopoly would be to include launch costs in the budget for the satellite being launched, rather than as a separate line item, and empower each satellite program manager to choose the launch option that is best for his or her system. Doing so would empower program managers to optimally manage risk across their entire system and incentivize them to elect less expensive launch options, when appropriate for their system, by allowing them to use the resultant savings to improve satellite capabilities.
When launch becomes a commercial commodity it will no longer make fiscal sense to centrally manage it at the MAJCOM or Center level. Unfortunately, centrally managing launch at the MAJCOM and Center levels may slow the commoditization process.
In addition to lowering launch costs, the US national security space enterprise should incorporate resiliency requirements into space architectures. One simple approach would require each architecture to survive the loss of one satellite. There are many other approaches.
The important point is that program offices respond to requirements, and if resiliency is not a requirement then space architectures are not going to be resilient. Incorporating resiliency into requirements will make disaggregated architectures more financially appealing; it is also the right thing to do for space protection.
The pace at which technology and threats are evolving requires flexibility in US space architectures, so the US national security space enterprise should value architecture flexibility more highly. Rather than locking the nation into decades of building only a few large and expensive satellites, program offices should assume that some requirements will evolve. Doing so will highlight one of the key benefits of disaggregation.
Finally, the US must recognize that the transition to disaggregated architectures will be challenging, politically more than technically. US space leaders should pay attention to implementation details such as budget phasing, formal requirements and policies, and countering inertia and other barriers to change.
The US space enterprise is evolving. Changes are inevitable, driven by sweeping and powerful global trends. Since the only alternative is irrelevance, the US space enterprise must embrace these changes and turn them into opportunities. Disaggregating will be challenging, but by viewing it as an opportunity rather than a threat, the US will emerge stronger and more capable. By implementing smooth, deliberate, and thoughtful disaggregation, the US will continue to lead the world in space technology, acumen, and capability.
Appendix 1
This appendix contains the details of the Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model (USCM) inputs and outputs for the communications disaggregation example used in Table 1 through Table 4 . Figure 4 shows the exact inputs used and Figure 5 the exact cost estimates generated by the model. 
